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Corporate governance attributes represent a resort for achieving the quality of the audit process, being 
a driving force of the entity`s corporate governance mosaic. The aim of this research is to investigate the 
association between audit quality and corporate governance attributes in the case of Romanian`s listed 
entities. In order to achieve this goal, a multiple regression was constituted with the following variables: 
audit quality as a dependent variable, and a series of corporate governance elements as independent 
variables, while firm size, firm age and industry being designed as controls. The full sample consists of 
the entities listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange in the period 2008-2012, compiling both tier I, II and 
III companies. This research contributes to the existing literature in the area of emerging economies by 
being the first article that addresses the issue of audit quality and corporate governance attributes at 
the level of listed companies in Romania, one of the European Union`s emerging economies. 
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Corporate governance is perceived as being a key-element in the capital market`s 
development. According to World Bank Report – Improving Corporate Governance in 
Emerging Markets (2011), good corporate governance reduces the emerging markets` 
vulnerability associated to financial crisis, reduces the capital and transactions cost and, 
moreover, conducts to the development of capital markets, due to the fact that the capital 
markets represent a transparency conductor. 
 
Corporate governance has been perceived as a vital tool in assessing the company`s health, 
especially under conditions of financial distress, such as the financial crisis. According to 
Adeyemi and Temitope (2010), the weakness of corporate governance is perhaps the most 
important factor blamed for the corporate failure, reason why the issue of good corporate 
governance practices gains a vivid importance, especially after the economic and financial 
crisis. 
 
The company`s decision of adopting a specific corporate governance mechanism is 
influenced by a series of endogenous factors, such as the fundamental characteristics of that 
entity, managerial attributes and other corporative variables. Still, one of the most 
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important functions that the corporate governance can fulfil is the one of assuring the 
quality of financial reporting (Cohen, Wright and Krishnamoorthy, 2004). In order to achieve 
its goal, out of the corporate governance mosaic, the audit committee plays a critical role by 
its main attribute of overseeing the financial reporting process under its major duty of 
certifying the integrity and credibility of financial reports. 
 
This research aims to investigate the association between audit quality and corporate 
governance attributes in the case of Romanian`s listed entities. In Romania, one of the 
European Union`s emerging economies, the Bucharest Stock Exchange has proven its 
interest in the importance of corporate governance area by implementing a Code of 
Corporate Governance and specific Guidelines applicable to the listed companies since 2008. 
 
The Bucharest Stock Exchange Code of Corporate Governance addresses a series of specific 
aspects related to corporate governance, such as corporate governance structures, 
shareholders` rights, the Board composition, transparency, financial reporting, internal 
control and risk management. Although the Code embraces a wide area of corporate 
governance aspects, its adoption by the listed companies is made on a voluntary basis, fact 
that leads to the assertion that the corporate governance rules elaborated by the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange are neither legally binding, nor mandatory. 
 
Taking the previous aspects into consideration, it can be stated that the Romanian`s Code of 
Corporate Governance role is to promote a transparent and responsible managerial 
behaviour in accordance with international best practices, without enforcing these rules 
applicable for the listed companies. Based on this aspect, it is very difficult to capture the 
way the external auditors interact with the corporate governance practices adopted on a 
voluntary basis by the client. 
 
The reminder of this paper is organized as it follows: Section 2 provides the relevant 
literature review, being centred on the researches conducted in the area of corporate 
governance and external auditor, Section 3 is dedicated to the research design and the 
methodology used in order to test the regression, while the last part of this article concerns 
the interpretations of the research`s results. Finally, Section 5 presents the limitations of this 
research and Section 6 reveals the main conclusions arising from the findings of this study. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
According to Deloitte (2013), the audit committee is seen as a ``key fulcrum of any 
company``, thus the responsibility for assessing effectiveness of the audit committee is 
assuming more and more importance. 
 
The Chief Executive Officer duality signals the separation between decision control and 
decision management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994), fact that 
leads to a concentration of power that reduces board monitoring effectiveness (Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni, 1994) which resides into lack of transparency and high information asymmetry. 
Taking these findings into account, it can be stated that companies with Chief Executive 
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Officer duality are more likely to be associated with a lower level of disclosure (Gul and 
Leung, 2004). 
 
Another relevant study was conducted by Abdullah (2006) in an emerging economy and his 
findings indicate that the separation between the Board Chairman and the Chief Executive 
Officer, a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the Board, lower level of gearing 
and more profitable firms are more likely to reduce the length of the audit process. In the 
same area of researches, Afify (2009) investigated corporate governance variables in the 
Egyptian context revealed that Board independence and the separation between the Board 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer decreased on a significant manner the length of audit. 
 
The prior literature provides findings in supporting the assumption that Big 4 auditors 
conduct higher quality audits compared to non-Big 4 auditors. For example, Lawrence et al. 
(2011) provide suggestive evidence that results in prior literature need to be reconsidered, 
namely because these previous results could be explained by client-specific characteristics, 
such as firm size, that lead to a selection bias in the analyses. They conclude that these 
arguments may be leading to an erroneous inference that Big 4 auditors conduct higher 
quality audits. 
 
The external auditor plays a crucial role in promoting the quality of financial reporting. The 
researches done in this area suggest that strong corporate governance mechanisms are 
associated with selecting auditors of a higher quality (such as Big 4). At a consensus level, the 
studies conducted in prior literature emphasise the positive association between audit 
committee`s independence and expertise and the external audit function`s efficacy (Cohen, 
Wright and Krishnamoorthy, 2004). 
 
Due to the fact that the major observable outcome of an audit process is represented by the 
audit report, in the literature various proxies have been used in order to assess audit quality. 
Francis et al. (1999) suggest that Big 4 auditors are able to constrain opportunistic and 
aggressive reporting because their clients have higher total accruals, but lower discretionary 
accruals. This approach is focused on earnings management, on managerial behaviour which 
interfere with the financial reporting process. According to Lawrence et al. (2011), an 
extensive stream of literature focuses on the client`s financial statements, in which 
discretionary accruals are often used as a proxy for audit quality as they reflect the auditor`s 
constraint over management`s reporting decisions. 
 
 
3. Methodology and research design 
 
3.1. Sample Selection 
 
In order to assess the association between audit quality and corporate governance attributes 
at the level of Romanian listed companies, the following restrictions are being used: 
 The financial institutions were eliminated due to homogeneity considerations; 
 The analyzed period is of five years, between 2008 and 2012; 
 The entities must be present on the Bucharest Stock Exchange in all of these five 
years; 
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 The sample compiles entities listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange Tier I, II and III. 
After applying these restrictions, the final sample consists of 61 entities, analyzed through a 
period of five years. 
 
 
3.2. Research Hypotheses Development 
 
The research`s hypotheses were developed in order to assess the aim of this study, namely 
to investigate the association between audit quality and specific corporate governance 
attributes. In accordance, six hypotheses were formulated as it follows: 
 Hypothesis 1: There is a significant association between audit quality and board 
independence. 
 Hypothesis 2: There is a strong correlation between audit quality and Chief Executive 
Officer Duality. 
 Hypothesis 3: There is a significant association between audit quality and institutional 
ownership. 
 Hypothesis 4: There is a strong relation between audit quality and managerial 
ownership. 
 Hypothesis 5: There is a significant association between audit quality and audit 
committee existence. 
 Hypothesis 6: There is a strong relation between audit quality and firm size, business 
complexity and financial leverage. 
 
 
3.3. Empirical Model 
 
In order to test the research hypothesis, the modified Soliman and Elsalam (2012) logistic 




AQ: audit quality; BI: board independence; CD: CEO duality; IO: institutional investors; MO: 
managerial ownership; AC: audit committee existence; CONTROLS: control variables 
composed of three independent variable, namely SZ: firm`s size; CM: business complexity and 
LE: financial leverage. 
 
This multiple regression was implemented for determining the association between the 
audit quality which represents the dependent variable and specific corporate governance 
attributes, which constitute the independent variable. 
 
 
3.3.1. Variables` Definition 
 
The dependent variable of the regression is represented by the Audit quality, while Board 
independence, CEO duality, Institutional ownership, Managerial ownership and Audit 
committee existence are defined as independent variables. Firm size, Business complexity 
and Financial leverage are control variables. 
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 Audit quality (AQ) was dichotomous in nature and the size of audit firm (Big four or 
non-Big four) was used as a proxy for audit quality. Further, this variable equals 1 if 
the external auditor is Big four and 0 otherwise; 
 Board independence (BI) was measured in terms of percentage of non-executive 
members in the board of directors; 
 CEO duality(CD) was dichotomous and operated as 1 if the position of Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer was occupied by the same person and 0 otherwise; 
 Institutional investors (IO) was measured through the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions in relation to the company`s issued capital; 
 Managerial ownership (MO) was computed as the number of shares owned by 
managers in relation to the company`s issued capital; 
 Audit committee existence (AC) was defined as a dummy variable: it equals 1 if the 
company has an audit committee, otherwise it equals 0; 
 CONTROLS: Control variables composed of firm size, business complexity and firm`s 
financial leverage, variables described below as it can be noticed: 
1. Firm size (SZ) was measured using the natural logarithm of total company assets; 
2. Business complexity (CM) was defined by dividing the sum of total accounts 
receivable and inventories to total assets; 
3. Firm`s financial leverage (LE) was measured as the ratio of debt to total assets. 
 
 
4. Results and discussions 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The Descriptive Statistics section is devoted to presenting and interpreting the results of the 
data collected in order to test the research`s hypothesis. The demarche was conducted using 
Microsoft Excel Data Analysis Tool, and the output of this statistical approach is being 
analyzed as it follows. 
 
 
Variables Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Range 
Audit Quality 0 1 0.2786 0.4490 1 
Board Independence 0 0.85 0.6323 0.1522 0.85 
CEO Duality 0 1 0.4688 0.4998 1 
Institutional Ownership 0 0.98 0.5623 0.2830 0.98 
Managerial Ownership 0 0.78 0.1310 0.2285 0.78 
Audit Committee 0 1 0.2983 0.4582 1 
Firm Size 16.51 24.36 19.0042 1.4223 7.85 
Business Complexity 0.006 1.9 0.3434 0.2398 1.894 
Financial Leverage 0.005 1.45 0.2878 0.2559 1.445 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The results presented in Table 1 indicate that 28% (more precisely 27.86%) of the Romanian 
listed companies are audited by a Big 4 audit firm. In which concerns the independence of 
the Board, 63% (63.23%) of the members are classified as independent, reaching a minimum 
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of 0 independent members and a maximum of 85% non-executive members. When 
analyzing the CEO duality, the results show that 47% (46.88%) of the Romanian companies 
listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange in the period from 2008 until 2012 are characterised 
by the fact that the position of Chairman and the one of Chief Executive Officer is being held 
by the same person, duality which supports this pattern in terms of emerging economies 
corporate governance characteristics. Overall, the Romanian entities Boards seem to be 
dominated by a single person. 
 
Moving forward with the analysis of descriptive statistics, the results indicate, through the 
percentage of institutional ownership, namely 56.23%, that the average shares owned by 
institutions related to the companies` issued capital reach a percentage of approximately 56. 
As far as the control variables are concerned, Table 1 provides evidence of these three 
controls: firm size, business complexity and financial leverage. 
 
 
4.2. Regression Output Analysis 
 
In order to test the proposed hypotheses for this research, the analysis of logistic regression 
is being conducted. Table 2 presents the Matrix Correlation Analysis, namely the demarche 
of testing the multicollinearity issue that could affect the variables. 
 
As it can be noticed in the following table, none of the variables is being affected by 
multicollinearity, due to the fact that the Pearson`s R Coefficient between each pair is 




Table 2: Matrix Correlation Analysis 
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Table 3: Covariance Analysis 
 
 
Table 4: Regression Output 
 
In the table 4, the results of the regression output are being presented as a basis for testing 
the initial hypothesis developed for this study. The R Square and Adjusted R Square describe 
the explanatory power of the regression model. Still, the Adjusted R Square for this 
regression is 34%, value which does not promote an acceptable explanatory power for the 
model. 
As far as the corporate governance attributes are concerned, the following table (Table 5) 
indicate that there is no association between audit quality and board independence, namely 
the first Hypothesis is not being validated. When analyzing the p-value for the CEO Duality 
variable, the significance of this value indicates a negative association between the audit 
quality and the CEO duality, fact which supports Hypothesis 2. Under this result, it can be 
stated that the more the audit quality increases, the less importance gains the single person 
that cumulates the two functions: CEO and Chairman. 
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Table 5: Regression Variables` Results 
 
The regression variables` results show that there is a negative association between audit 
quality and institutional ownership in the case of Romanian`s listed entities, finding which 
supports Hypothesis 3. Still, when taking into account the managerial ownership, the results 
indicate no association between this corporate governance attribute and the audit quality 
(p-value of 0.62), fact that does not validate the research`s Hypothesis 4. 
 
 
Table 6: Regression Variables` Results- Controls 
 
Empirical results indicate a strong positive association between audit quality and the 
existence of an audit committee at the companies` level, supporting Hypothesis 5. This 
finding suggests that the audit committee is responsible for the appointment of a Big 4 audit 
firm, recommending, in accordance, the nomination of the external auditor. When analyzing 
the controls, the results indicate a positive association between audit quality and firm size, 
partially supporting Hypothesis 6, as Table 6 presents. Still, the results do not indicate an 
association between audit quality and business complexity, on the one hand, and audit 
quality and financial leverage, on the other hand. 
 
 
5. Limitations of this research 
 
This research has several drawbacks. First of all, the sample consists of 61 entities analyzed 
through a period of five years, fact that leads to a sample small in size and, as a 
consequence, to a sceptical approach in evaluating the results. Still, the sample remains the 
same throughout the analyzed period of time, leading to a relevant output, from this point 
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of view. Second of all, the R Square and Adjusted R Square- which show the explanatory 
power of the model- are far below 80%, conducting to a regression which has a small 
explanatory power for the selected entities. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and further research 
 
The aim of this research is to examine the association between the audit quality and specific 
corporate governance attributes in the case of Romanian`s listed entities. This study reveals 
that there is a negative association between the audit quality and the CEO duality, on the 
one hand, and institutional ownership, on the other hand. Moreover, the empirical results 
indicate a strong positive association between audit quality and the existence of an audit 
committee at the companies` level. 
 
Still, in the case of Romania, the results indicate that there is no association between audit 
quality and board independence, as well as managerial ownership. Thus, all the other 
variables that were found not to have a significant impact on the audit quality had, however, 
a punctual correlation with the quality of audit, at certain levels. 
 
The above-mentioned findings emphasise the influence of corporate governance attributes 
on the quality of financial reporting process, especially in an emerging economy, 
characterized by a less-developed financial infrastructure and a real need for transparency 
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Appendix Sample - Companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange  
from 2008 until 2012 
 
Nr crt  Company Name 
1 Aerostar  
2 Alro 
3 Altur 
4 Alumil Rom Industry 






11 Boromir Prod 
12 C.N.T.E.E Transelectrica 
13 Calipso 
14 Carbochim 















30 Farmaceutica Remedia 
31 Grupul Industrial Electrocontact 
32 Impact Developer&Contractor 
33 Mecanica Ceahlau 
34 Mefin 
35 MJ Maillis Romania 
36 Oil Terminal 
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37 Oltchim 






44 Rompetrol Rafinare 
45 Ropharma 
46 S.N.T.G.N Transgaz 
47 Santierul Naval Orsova 
48 Transilvania Constructii 
49 Sinteza 




54 TMK- Artrom 
55 Turbomecanica 
56 Turism Felix 
57 Turism, Hoteluri, Restaurante Marea Neagra 
58 VES 
59 voestalpine VAE Apcarom 
60 Vrancart 
61 Zentiva 
